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# The Libyan-Ethiopian- South Yemeni Pact: Short-Term Prospects

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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THE LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN-  
SOUTH YEMENI PACT:  
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

Information available as of 4 November 1981 was  
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*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:*

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*Also Participating:*

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

The Cooperation Treaty signed on 19 August 1981 by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen emerged from complex and disparate motives:

- The participants want to defeat US policy in the region.
- They seek to provide mutual defense against perceived threats from the West.
- Ethiopia wants Libyan aid.
- South Yemen seeks Libyan aid as well as control over Libyan assistance to North Yemeni dissidents. President al-Hasani also may hope that membership in the alliance will enhance his domestic standing.
- Libya seeks to reduce its isolation and gain accomplices for its schemes against Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt.

The Soviets long encouraged the formation of a broad, anti-US regional grouping, and they played an indirect and behind-the-scenes role in the formation of the pact. The pact serves important Soviet regional objectives and reflects a convergence of interest between Moscow and the signatories. Given Libyan leader Qadhafi's past record of not fulfilling his aid promises, the Soviets may have doubts about the effectiveness of the pact, but will seek to gain maximum advantage from it and will work to strengthen the alliance. The three pact members, however, cannot necessarily be counted on to follow Soviet direction.

The most likely threat from the alliance is increased cooperation among the three for subversive operations against Sudan, Somalia, Oman, Egypt, and North Yemen, and possibly for terrorist actions against US personnel and facilities in those countries.

Despite cooperation among the leaders of the pact states, they will not be able substantially to increase their capability to project military power in the near term. Qadhafi may push for the use of military facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen to extend his activities throughout the Arabian Peninsula region, but Aden and Addis Ababa are unlikely to allow him use of their territories for his own military aims.

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There are other weaknesses in the alliance that limit its effectiveness:

- The degree of Ethiopia's participation depends in part on extensive Libyan aid.
- Although Qadhafi has made the first \$150 million transfer to Ethiopia of the promised \$855.1 million, he may procrastinate on further payments.
- Ethiopia's Mengistu will probably move cautiously in cooperating with Libya against Sudanese President Nimeiri.
- Ethiopia and South Yemen will try to avoid involvement in Qadhafi's more ambitious ventures where they might damage their own national interests.
- A lessening of the perceived threat from the United States by any of the three allies would decrease the cohesiveness of the pact.

Despite the pact's weaknesses, pro-Western governments in the region are alarmed and their alarm could lead to positive effects for the United States:

- The Gulf Cooperation Council is beginning to conduct serious discussions on security cooperation.
- Egypt has announced its intentions to react strongly to Libyan meddling in Sudan.
- Somalia and Kenya are giving new attention to rapprochement.
- These pro-Western governments will seek more US aid, thereby offering the United States new opportunities to cooperate with them.
- Qadhafi's credibility could be further weakened if he fails to perform for his new allies.



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## DISCUSSION

**The Alliance**

1. The series of agreements recently concluded by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen call for close political, economic, and military cooperation among the signatories. The centerpiece of the alliance is the Cooperation Treaty, signed on 19 August 1981, which contains mutual defense clauses and several secret military annexes.

2. The three allies agreed to coordinate increased aid to the insurgent Somali Salvation Front (SSF), which is attempting to overthrow the government of Somali President Siad. They also discussed possible future subversive activity against other regional states. Previously, Libya had promised Ethiopia \$855.1 million in aid over an extended period.

3. The various neighboring regimes that each member of the alliance hopes for its own reasons to undermine are important to US and Western interests. (See map on next page.) In the long run, some members at least hope to form the nucleus of an expanding bloc of radical and anti-Western states in the Middle East and Africa.

**Genesis of the Pact—Convergence of Interests**

4. The three allies share a deep concern over the increasing US presence around the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, including the military access agreements signed with Somalia, Kenya, and Oman in 1980. Two of the three allies—Ethiopia and South Yemen—have a common interest in tapping the Libyan treasury.

**Ethiopian Interests**

5. Ethiopia sees a direct threat in any US move to strengthen its traditional enemy Somalia, which mounted a major invasion of eastern Ethiopia in 1977 and continues to support separatist guerrillas there in pursuit of claims to a substantial part of Ethiopia's territory. Ethiopia has reacted by strengthening its military position in the disputed Ogaden territory and by establishing, training, arming, and directing the SSF. At the least, Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu believes the Salvation Front can stir up enough trouble in Somalia to keep Mogadishu from pursuing its anti-Ethiopian designs, and probably believes that the Siad regime there is unstable enough to be overthrown.

6. Probably as a result of Mengistu's optimistic view of the SSF, he has permitted Libyan aid, and, to a lesser extent, Soviet and South Yemeni aid to be passed to the insurgents. Instinctively suspicious of the long-range intentions of any group of armed Somalis—including present allies—Mengistu originally prevented any contact between the Salvation Front and outside powers, including his Soviet sponsors. But he also wished to shift some of the financial burden of supporting the SSF and is eager to give the appearance of international support for a Somali insurgency. Even so, the Ethiopians continue efforts to limit foreign involvement with their guerrilla clients. The increase in the level of Libyan assistance to the insurgents during the past year has come largely at Libyan leader Qadhafi's urging and despite Mengistu's earlier foot-dragging.

7. The prospect of sizable amounts of Libyan aid almost certainly encouraged the financially strapped Ethiopians to sign the pact. Nevertheless, the assistance, if forthcoming, will not solve Ethiopia's immediate economic problems. Ethiopia's export revenues are expected to stagnate, and it is conscious of its contracted arms debt of approximately \$4 billion with the Soviet Union. In addition, Ethiopia's limited foreign exchange reserves are being eaten up by its escalating

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oil bill to the Soviets. Moscow's failure to provide Ethiopia with significant economic aid, to discuss more lenient terms for repayment on the arms debt, or to provide regular, long-term oil supplies has been a continuing irritant in relations between the two nations. Ethiopia's attempts to get oil and economic aid from Western and Arab sources have had limited success.

8. Mengistu has reportedly said that he would not allow his relationship with Sudan to stand in the way of Libyan economic aid. He is aware of past Sudanese support for the Eritrean rebellion, and may not be confident that his current rapprochement with Khar-

toum will be long lived. As Sudan and the United States draw closer together, the Ethiopians may become increasingly concerned that Washington could encourage Khartoum to renew its support for the Eritreans and allow Sudanese territory to be used to stage other dissident attacks inside Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Mengistu is not eager to be seen elsewhere in Africa as being in Qadhafi's league as a supporter of subversion and terrorism in neighboring states.

#### Libya Interests

9. Libya's involvement in the alliance stems from a desire to achieve several overlapping goals. First and

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most importantly, Qadhafi wants to undermine American influence and interests in the region. He has long opposed Washington's initiatives in the area, particularly the Camp David accords and US facilities agreements with northeast African and Persian Gulf states. In March, for example, he publicly admitted that his government was providing aid to guerrillas in Oman and Somalia in what was to be a "strategic counteroffensive against American imperialism represented by US military bases in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Palestine."

10. Since then, perceptions of increased Israeli belligerence—manifested by the airstrikes on Iraq's nuclear reactor and on PLO targets in Lebanon—have increased Qadhafi's hostility to what he terms a "US-Egyptian-Israeli" plot. The recent deterioration in US-Libyan relations, however, has added a new dimension to the Libyan leader's antagonism toward the United States. A variety of factors—allegations in the press about a CIA plot against Qadhafi, the expulsion of the Libyan People's Bureau from Washington, the US rejection of Libyan overtures for better relations—have apparently convinced the Libyan leader that Washington is plotting his overthrow. His fears were reinforced following the Gulf of Sidra incident of August 1981. These factors have prompted him to undertake more dynamic initiatives in hopes of thwarting US plans not only regarding Libya, but throughout North Africa and the Middle East as well.

11. Tripoli's second goal—to subvert the governments of Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt—complements its first objective. By promoting instability in these three nations, Qadhafi not only strikes at three anti-Libyan regimes, but acts against American interests as well.

12. A final reason probably stems from Qadhafi's desire to enhance his political image. He has demonstrated sensitivity to charges that he is an international outcast, and he probably views such multinational alliances as increasing his international respectability. In addition, such pacts give him a convenient forum from which to preach his unique brand of radicalism.

#### South Yemeni Interests

13. The Aden government regards the deepening US military involvement in the area, especially the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, as a direct threat to its security and an obstacle to its efforts to subvert neighboring regimes and break out

of its present isolation. South Yemen in fact sought to foster a much broader coalition of anti-Western states earlier this year in a bid to strengthen its ties with other Arab radical states and to counter the Gulf Cooperation Council, a coalition of conservative Persian Gulf states.

14. By accepting a more narrowly based pact, South Yemeni President al-Hasani still hopes at a minimum to bolster his prestige and somewhat shaky domestic position, to enhance his standing with Moscow, and to profit from Libyan aid. South Yemen probably also hopes to gain greater control over the assistance Libya now gives the North Yemeni National Democratic Front (NDF) insurgent movement. South Yemeni leaders do not trust Qadhafi completely and fear he may try to use the NDF to promote his interests at Aden's expense. In exchange, Aden is clearly prepared to continue providing safehaven and training for Somali dissidents and other radical groups that could be used against US interests in the region.

#### Soviet Interest in the Pact

15. The Soviets have been trying to promote the formation of a broad anti-US regional grouping, and they played an indirect and behind-the-scenes role in the formation of the pact. The pact serves several important Soviet objectives and reflects a convergence of Moscow's and the signatories' interests. The three leaders, however, cannot necessarily be counted on to follow Soviet direction.

16. As early as 1977, the Soviets expressed concern that the Red Sea would be dominated by pro-US Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This was one of the reasons Moscow responded as quickly as it did to the changing situation in the Horn in 1977. Since then, the Soviets have successfully urged closer South Yemeni-Ethiopian and, more recently, Libyan-Ethiopian ties.

17. Throughout the spring and summer of 1981, the Soviets reportedly were encouraging the formation of a "common front" of Arab states both to offset the Gulf Cooperation Council and to combat Washington's efforts to bolster US forces in the Arabian Peninsula region. The objective apparently was to draw Algeria, Syria, and the PLO, as well as South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia, into a grouping with a broader orientation and impact than those of the narrowly focused Steadfastness Front of Arab states rejecting the Camp David peace process.

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18. In the months before the signing of the treaty, the Soviets sought to facilitate closer relations among the states of the region. Several delegations of Lebanese Communists and Palestinians visited Addis Ababa during this period, reportedly to persuade Mengistu that it was safe to deal with Qadhafi. Palestinian representatives and President al-Hasani reportedly also tried to persuade Syria to join an anti-US regional grouping. Both the Ethiopians and the Syrians believed these representations were backed by the Soviets.

19. Although the alliance falls well short of Moscow's initial goal, it seems to serve a number of Soviet interests:

- It may facilitate better coordination of subversive and political efforts aimed at undercutting the growth of US influence in the area.
- It may tie Ethiopia more closely to the radical community and could undercut any potential drift back toward the West.
- Through Libyan aid, Ethiopia and South Yemen may eventually get hard currency with which to pay for Soviet weaponry. Ethiopian inability to meet debt payments for arms could be a major irritant in relations between Addis Ababa and Moscow. Furthermore, if Ethiopia is able to purchase oil from Libya at a discount, it will help alleviate Addis Ababa's near-total dependence on Soviet supplies, already a source of strain in Soviet-Ethiopian relations.
- The treaty gives Qadhafi some degree of the political and psychological support he has been seeking from Moscow to ease his increasing international isolation. The Soviets have been reluctant to respond directly to Qadhafi's calls for more visible support lest they become more closely identified with the Libyan leader and share his isolation among the Arabs.
- Moscow may hope that formation of the new bloc will press conservative Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia to adopt a more accommodating posture.

20. The Soviets may be skeptical about Qadhafi's willingness to fulfill his promises and thus about the pact's longevity and effectiveness. They are traditionally uneasy with radical blocs not under their direct control. Some negative consequences for Moscow

could occur in the region from the formation of the pact:

- The alliance could push the Gulf Cooperation Council toward serious security cooperation and/or closer ties with the United States.
- It could identify the Soviets more closely with the most extreme states in the region, putting the USSR in an isolated position it has long sought to avoid.
- The pact could create new differences rather than increased cohesion among Moscow's Arab allies in view of Syrian, Algerian, and PLO lack of interest in the alliance. This might weaken the anti-US concentration of the Steadfastness Front without strengthening Arab opposition to US moves around the Persian Gulf.
- Libyan influence might dilute the Soviets' own in Ethiopia and South Yemen.

21. The Soviets, however, do not seem to be concerned that these consequences are likely to occur. In fact, their behind-the-scenes role in the formation of the alliance demonstrates that they view the pact as beneficial to their objectives. Moscow has demonstrated its interest and support in a low-key manner. Its support was probably affirmed during the visit of Czechoslovakia's President Husak to Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen in early September, during which aspects of the alliance were apparently discussed. On the other hand, Moscow has played down its public reaction to the pact. The Soviets apparently intend to continue their support of greater cooperation among the three allies, reserve judgment on the durability of the alliance, yet seek the maximum advantage possible from it.

22. The Soviets are probably keeping their Cuban allies informed of developments in the alliance, although there are no indications that Havana was involved in the formation of the pact. Cuba maintains 11,000 to 13,000 military personnel in Ethiopia, mostly on garrison duty in the Ogaden and near Addis Ababa, and approximately 500 advisers in South Yemen. These serve as strategic reserves for the Ethiopian and South Yemeni Governments and are not actively engaged in hostilities at this time. It is highly unlikely that the pact members envisage their use in joint offensive operations in the foreseeable future, including any against Oman or Sudan.

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### Weaknesses of the Pact—Divergence of Interests Within the Alliance

23. Despite their common interests, significant differences remain among the three new allies. One stumblingblock is Ethiopia's antipathy toward Arabs, the country's traditional enemies. Mengistu has never trusted Qadhafi and considers him unstable at best. Qadhafi's transfer in mid-October of \$150 million to Ethiopia—the first installment of his \$855.1 million aid commitment—ensures close military cooperation, and continued transfers may lead to the deployment of some Ethiopian troops to Libya. But Libyan foot-dragging on additional aid would limit Ethiopian cooperation on other aspects of the pact.

24. Policy toward Sudan may represent another major difference between Ethiopia and Libya. Qadhafi wants to overthrow the Nimeiri regime and, at the very least, would like to use Ethiopia to pressure Nimeiri to withdraw support for anti-Libyan forces in Chad. The Libyan leader also wants Mengistu to allow Ethiopian territory to be used by anti-Nimeiri insurgents.

25. Qadhafi's interest in overthrowing President Nimeiri appears unaffected by the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. Libya's strategy is to work against Khartoum through support of insurgent elements rather than direct military intervention, particularly now that the latter strategy carries with it greater risks of an Egyptian and US military response.

26. In the past two years, Ethiopia and Sudan have worked out a mutually beneficial *modus vivendi*. Addis Ababa now has established a dialogue with Khartoum, which historically has provided sanctuary to Eritrea's various secessionist groups. While Mengistu has no present intention of seriously negotiating with the Eritrean insurgents, he has been able to play upon Sudanese hopes of mediating—which has led, in part, to Khartoum's decision to crack down on some of the Sudanese-based Eritrean guerrillas. Khartoum, in return, feels less threatened by the possibility of cross-border raids by Ethiopian-based Sudanese rebels.

27. Mengistu is unlikely to jeopardize the benefits of his detente with Sudan by openly cooperating with Qadhafi against Nimeiri unless the Libyans continue to meet their aid commitments. In any event, we believe that Mengistu will move cautiously at first in cooperating with Libya in assisting Sudanese dissidents. The Ethiopians have already begun low-level

assistance to Libya's anti-Nimeiri schemes, however. This has raised Sudanese suspicions concerning Ethiopian intentions and is leading Khartoum to reconsider its restrictions on anti-Ethiopian organizations. Should these restrictions be lifted, a rapid deterioration of Ethiopian-Sudanese ties would ensue.

28. From the South Yemeni perspective, President al-Hasani is uncomfortable with Qadhafi's self-appointed role in promoting unity between North and South Yemen. Aden fears that Libyan meddling could lead to a serious deterioration in the facade of cordial relations with Sanaa that Aden has sought to sustain. Moreover, South Yemen probably doubts Qadhafi's commitment to begin channeling Libyan aid to the National Democratic Front through Aden. South Yemen and Libya support different factions within the NDF and Aden wishes to continue controlling the level and tactics of NDF subversion in North Yemen.

29. Finally, both Ethiopia and South Yemen recognize Qadhafi's extremist and quixotic character. In general, both Aden and Addis Ababa will be reluctant to take dramatic turns of policy or reckless actions without carefully considering the ramifications for their own narrow national interests.

### Regional Reactions to the Pact

30. Despite the pact's fragile nature, Western-oriented states of the region are concerned. This concern has been amplified by the assassination of Sadat and suspicions that Libya was somehow involved. Concerns about the pact have been actively vented to US representatives.

31. The ability of regional states to act collectively to counter hostile activity undertaken as the result of the pact is limited at present. Much depends on the activities of more influential regional players—Saudi Arabia and Egypt—either to motivate a joint response or assist the threatened states individually.

### Somalia

32. The Somali Government recognizes that it is a prime target of the new alliance and is predictably alarmed. Somalia's fears of an imminent invasion by regular forces from Ethiopia or South Yemen, or both, are unrealistic. But Somalia can anticipate increased Ethiopian-backed military activity and terrorist incidents staged by the Somali Salvation Front. Its security forces, lacking experience and proper training to deal

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with terrorism, will have difficulty responding effectively.

33. The pact will bring increased aid to the SSF, but its small size (about 2,500), narrow tribal base, and close association with the Ethiopians severely undercut its appeal in Somalia. As a result, it is not capable of overthrowing the Siad regime on its own.

34. Nevertheless, Siad has already been subjected to high-level government criticism—and suggestions that he step aside—prompted by his inability to deal with severe economic and internal and external security problems. An increase in SSF activity in Somalia, however, especially if accompanied by more humiliating Ethiopian ground incursions and airstrikes along the border, could prompt moves by Somali officers to replace Siad.

35. Siad so far has attempted to deal with growing discontent, particularly within the military, by making token moves to decentralize the Somali economy and by promising strong US support resulting from the access agreement. His Army realizes the limited nature of the US military aid commitment, however, and pressure on Siad has increased. Siad already has responded by pressing Washington for more aid and, citing new dangers posed by the pact, for a rapid acceleration in the delivery of arms aid already promised.

36. The Siad regime is making a greater effort to improve relations with Kenya, which have long been strained by Mogadishu's claim to Kenya's ethnic Somali-inhabited Northeastern Province. For the past few months, at the urging of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and several West European powers, Nairobi and Mogadishu have made some progress in trying to submerge their differences, although suspicions linger.

#### Gulf Cooperation Council

37. Oman also sees itself threatened by the new alliance. The Omani Government raised its fears at the most recent meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The formation of the pact reportedly spurred council members—including Saudi Arabia—to discuss seriously future defense coordination, and this trend may gain added momentum from the situation in Egypt. One important convert was Kuwait, which had previously opposed such discussions. The council members agreed to hold up further aid commitments to

South Yemen and to launch a diplomatic campaign to persuade other East African states to pressure Ethiopia to stay out of Arabian Peninsula affairs.

38. Despite the initial concern of conservative Arab governments around the Persian Gulf, enthusiasm for concrete cooperation may wane if military collaboration among the pact members falters. Oman, however, almost certainly will keep prodding its partners to action. Saudi Arabia probably perceives the pact as evidence of the hostile objectives of radical regional states that are being directed by Qadhafi. The Saudis are pleased that their oil policies have had the byproduct of placing Qadhafi in financial straits, and they hope that continued pressure may limit his disruptive activities. Riyadh probably is concerned most with the effects the pact may have on attempts to subvert North Yemen.

#### North Yemen

39. Sanaa sees the pact as an attempt by Aden to widen support for the South Yemeni-sponsored National Democratic Front insurgents. Particularly distressed by Qadhafi's involvement, President Salih has embarked on a so far unsuccessful campaign to secure substantive political and military assistance from a variety of Arab states and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Increased Libyan assistance to the NDF—if it occurs—is likely to contribute to a further erosion of Salih's already diminished authority.

#### Kenya

40. The radical alliance has caused Kenyan President Moi and his advisers to have doubts about their relationship with Ethiopia. Common fear of Somali irredentism led Kenya and Ethiopia to conclude a loose military alliance in 1963. Nairobi and Addis Ababa have retained friendly ties and continued military cooperation despite the sharp shift in Ethiopia's ideological orientation since its 1974 revolution. However, several Kenyan leaders have recently expressed concern that the present Marxist-Leninist government in Ethiopia may pose a serious long-term threat to capitalist and pro-Western Kenya. In the wake of the Aden summit, Moi ordered a Foreign Ministry reevaluation of Kenya's ties with Ethiopia.

41. The pact may succeed in spurring Kenya's leaders toward a more serious rapprochement with

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Somalia despite lingering doubts about Siad's willingness to abandon Somalia's claim on Kenyan territory. The two governments remain far apart, however. Regardless of the prospects for detente with Somalia, Kenya probably will try to avoid antagonizing the Ethiopians. At the same time, Kenya is certain to request an increase in US military assistance and will move toward closer security cooperation with the United States.

#### Sudan

42. Despite improved Sudanese-Ethiopian relations, Khartoum recognizes that Libya will try to use the new alliance against it. The Sudanese have expressed fear that Libyan forces in Chad and Libya intend to cross the border to support Sudanese dissidents. In the aftermath of the Sadat assassination, Nimeiri feels particularly vulnerable.

While internal security considerations also played a major role in Nimeiri's crackdown on the Eritrean groups, the Sudanese leader probably will be looking for other ways to remain on good terms with Mengistu in the months to come.

43. Qadhafi's forces in Chad are currently tied up in their dual role as occupiers and counterinsurgents, and probably will confine their military actions in Sudan to airstrikes against Chadian rebel enclaves just over the border. Furthermore, Tripoli is aware of the Egyptian defense commitments to Sudan and is unlikely to conduct attacks that would prompt Cairo to initiate retaliatory action on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Finally, Qadhafi probably would also fear that Chadian rebel forces would use such an occasion to intensify the insurgency in Chad. He is likely, however, to continue support for anti-Nimeiri subversive forces, which increases his interest in using Ethiopia as a base for insurgent attacks into Sudan.

#### Egypt

44. The pact poses only an indirect threat to Egypt, primarily through Libya and possible future Ethiopian subversion against Sudan. The late President Sadat had reacted sharply to the pact by sending a stinging message to Qadhafi threatening to attack Libya if the Libyans took any action to undermine the Nimeiri regime. Then Vice President Hosni Moubarek followed up by traveling to Washington to persuade US officials to rush more aid to Sudan to meet the increased threat.

45. The mutual defense treaty signed by Egypt and Sudan in 1976 remains in force and Egyptian officials continue to view Sudan as vital to Egypt's defense. President Moubarek is almost certainly as committed to maintaining a moderate regime in Khartoum as was Sadat, even to the point of sending troops there. It is unlikely that Cairo would commit substantial military assets to Somalia or Oman despite its recent declaration that any threat to these countries will be "confronted firmly."

#### An Immediate US Target: Bright Star 82

46. The members of the pact can be expected to react strongly to the RDJTF Bright Star 82 exercise currently scheduled for 9 November to 15 December 1981. The exercise, which will involve 5,000 to 6,000 US troops,<sup>1</sup> will include joint training operations with Egyptian, Sudanese, and Omani forces and a smaller operation in Somalia in which the Somali military will not directly participate. Members of the pact, along with other nations and groups in the region hostile to the United States, probably will sharply condemn the exercise. Qadhafi in particular will view the exercise as a real military threat, and may press his new partners to join in an effort to disrupt it.

47. The Egyptian, Sudanese, and Omani forces participating in the exercise can be expected to provide protection for US troops. The majority of the American forces in the exercise will pass through the Cairo West airbase in Egypt, where a smaller but similar operation took place without incident last year. The pact members will try to encourage anti-American demonstrations throughout the region to protest Bright Star 82, but such protests will probably have

<sup>1</sup> Details of Bright Star 82 are subject to change.

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little impact on the actual conduct of the exercise. Libya and South Yemen will also try to use the issue at the Arab League summit this month to isolate conservative Arab states supportive of US interests.

48. Somalia is the most vulnerable point of the exercise in terms of potential terrorist disruption. Current Bright Star 82 plans call for approximately 250 military engineers and medical personnel, with their equipment, to be landed at Berbera.

49. The Libyans and the Somali Salvation Front, however, have publicly threatened to attack any Americans sent to Berbera, and several hundred Somali insurgents are currently undergoing guerrilla and terrorist training in Libya. In the past, the SSF's limited capabilities have restricted its terrorist activity to setting off explosives in Mogadishu, Berbera, Hargeisa, and Galcaio, and even now it may not be able to mark Bright Star 82 with more than another small terrorist attack to gain publicity.

#### Prospects for the Alliance

50. The near-term effectiveness of the alliance depends on continued concern about US activities in the area and the willingness and ability of the Libyans to fulfill their economic commitments. Should Qadhafi not generally fulfill his commitments, Mengistu is likely to back away. Qadhafi has a long record of failing to follow up his pledges, although he has done much better in fulfilling promises of military aid than he has in keeping economic aid pledges.<sup>2</sup>

51. The military provisions of the new alliance, the importance that Qadhafi places on the possible deployment of Ethiopian troops in Libya, and his apparent high hopes for the pact caused Qadhafi in mid-October to begin to fulfill his economic and military pledges to Ethiopia. With \$16 billion in foreign assets, Libya has the capability to fulfill all of Qadhafi's promises, although present short-term cash-flow prob-

lems resulting from falling oil exports may cause occasional difficulties in meeting some payments. Libyan officials, however, probably will dole out the promised aid parsimoniously, and this may in itself become a source of friction within the pact.

52. It is somewhat questionable whether Libya's partners will fulfill all of the military aspects of the pact.

the poor overall condition of the South Yemeni military makes it difficult for Aden to fulfill its commitments.

53. Libya's capabilities to deploy sizable forces to its partners are constrained by the perceived threat posed by Egypt as well as by logistic considerations. Although Tripoli spent several months preparing for the intervention in Chad, logistic support for the forces there has been a strain on the military. Major armed actions in areas that cannot be reached overland from Libya would severely tax Libya's already overworked airlift capabilities. Moreover, should Libya want to use Ethiopian or South Yemeni facilities for air or sea strikes in neighboring waters or against Saudi Arabia, Addis Ababa and Aden are unlikely to allow this use of their territory.

54. Should the pact leaders continue to cooperate, coordinated subversive activities within the next year will probably be directed against the Somali Government, with some aid being provided to dissident groups in North Yemen, Oman, Sudan, and possibly Egypt. The alliance will try to expand its influence in the Middle East and Africa as a counterbalance to Western influences, and will condemn US diplomatic or military efforts in the region.

55. The Soviets certainly are pleased with the currently strong anti-Western and anti-American direction of their three clients, and for the moment welcome the Bloc's intention to undermine US defense strategy in the Middle East and East Africa. The Soviets recognize that the independent-minded governments in Addis Ababa and Tripoli almost certainly will antagonize each other as well as their patron in

<sup>2</sup> From 1975 to 1980 Tripoli disbursed only \$1.4 billion in foreign military and economic aid, although it had promised \$3.3 billion. During that period it paid 70 percent of its military aid commitments but only 30 percent of its promised development assistance.

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Moscow. Nonetheless, the Soviets will work behind the scenes to strengthen the alliance.

56. The threat to regional states in the near term has been increased somewhat. The immediate threat is to such states as Somalia and Sudan. Any threat to others—Oman, North Yemen, Kenya, or Djibouti—is

unlikely to develop for some time. In the long run, however, if continued significant financial assistance from Libya to its partners is forthcoming, if the three allies continue to perceive a serious US threat to their interests, and if the pact goes unopposed by other states in the region, it could endanger pro-Western states there and US policy for the area.



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- h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
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